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Recent empirical research has shown that links between groups reinforce individuals within groups to adopt
cooperative behaviour. Moreover, links between networks may induce cascading failures, competitive perco-
lation, or contribute to efficient transportation. Here we show that there in fact exists an intermediate fraction
of links between groups that is optimal for the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game. We
consider individual groups with regular, random, and scale-free topology, and study their different combinations
to reveal that an intermediate interdependence optimally facilitates the spreading of cooperative behaviour be-
tween groups. Excessive between-group links simply unify the two groups and make them act as one, while
too rare between-group links preclude a useful information flow between the two groups. Interestingly, we find
that between-group links are more likely to connect two cooperators than in-group links, thus supporting the
conclusion that they are of paramount importance.
According to a recent study by Apicella et al. [1], so-
cial networks of the Hadza, a population of hunter-gatherers
in Tanzania, have much in common with modernized social
networks [2, 3]. Moreover, and of direct relevance for the
present study, Hadza camps exhibit high between-group and
low within-group variation in public goods game donations,
and the links are more likely between people who do cooper-
ate than between those who do not. Authors of [1] go on to
conclude that early humans may have formed ties with both
kin and non-kin, based in part on their tendency to cooperate,
and that thus social networks may have actually contributed
to the emergence and facilitated the evolution of cooperation
[4, 5]. Inspired by these results, we here address the relevance
of the interdependence between groups for the evolution of
cooperation by means of numerical simulations. We consider
two groups of certain size, whereby members of one group
are allowed to break one of their in-group links to connect
with a member in the other group, i.e., to form a between-
group link. This set-up is akin to previous studies that have
addressed the evolution of cooperation on interdependent net-
works [6–11], but also different in that we consider between-
group links to actually replace in-group links, and also by con-
sidering between-group links as fully equivalent to in-group
links in the sense that both payoff accumulation and strategy
transfer across them are allowed.
The promotion of cooperation on networks in general is
due to network reciprocity – a phenomenon first reported by
Nowak and May [12], who observed that on a square lattice
cooperators can aggregate into compact clusters and so pro-
tect themselves against defectors when playing a prisoner’s
dilemma game. Network reciprocity quickly rose to promi-
nence through a series of subsequent investigations on regular
lattices and graphs [13–16], and even more so through studies
of evolutionary games on small-world [17–21] and scale-free
[22–36] networks. Several recent reviews cover the topic in
detail, both for pairwise social dilemmas, such as the pris-
oner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game [37–39], as well as
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FIG. 1: Schematic presentation of two groups that are connected by
means of between-group links. Players in group A originally form
a random network, each with degree four, while players in group
B form a regular graph, each with degree six. Subsequently, each
player in group B severs one of its in-group links (depicted green)
with probability p and uses it to form a between-group link (depicted
red) with one randomly selected player from group A, the constrain
being that no player in either groups is allowed to have more than
one between-group link. In the example each group consists of 10
players and p = 0.2.
for evolutionary games that are governed by group interac-
tions, such as the public goods game [40]. Based on evolution-
ary games, in particular on the ability of influential players to
hinder the evolution of cooperation, also a network centrality
measure has recently been introduced – the so-called game
centrality [41]. Despite its prominence, however, network
reciprocity has also received a fair share of scepticism. Hauert
and Doebeli [42] reported that spatial structure often inhibits
the evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift game, while
recent large-scale human experiments performed by Gracia-
La´zaro et al. [43, 44] revealed that network reciprocity may
fail altogether.
Apart from the evolution of cooperation on interdepen-
dent networks [6–11], showing that interdependence works
predominantly in favour of the resolution of social dilem-
mas, previous research concerning interdependent networks
has addressed cascading failures [45–48], competitive perco-
lation [49, 50], transport [51], diffusion [52], neuronal syn-
chronization [53], financial trading [54], as well as their ro-
bustness against attack and assortativity [55, 56]. Networks
of networks have indeed captured the current attention of re-
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2FIG. 2: There is an intermediate fraction of between-group links
at which the fraction of cooperators is maximal, regardless of the
topologies of the two interdependent groups. Panel (a) depicts the
overall fraction of cooperators in both groups in dependence on the
probability to establish between-group links, as obtained for different
topologies of group A (see legend). Panels (b), (c) and (d) depict the
fraction of cooperators amongst players with and without between-
group links separately (see legend), as obtained when group A has
regular, random and scale-free topology, respectively. It can be ob-
served that cooperation is significantly more likely amongst player
that do have between-group links. Results were obtained using the
temptation to defect b = 1.18.
searchers across both social and natural sciences [57–60], and
here we aim to extend their scope further to the evolution of
cooperation among interdependent groups. The importance
of groups in evolutionary games is well established, either
through group competition [61], group selection [62, 63], or
the related multilevel selection [64, 65].
In this paper, individual groups are represented by networks
with different topology to account for different societal types,
while links between groups are formed probabilistically by
randomly choosing members in one group to break one of
their existing in-group links to form a between-group link with
a player from the other group. The set-up is depicted schemat-
ically in Fig. 1. Once established, between-group links do not
change during the course of evolution. All the players then
engage in the prisoner’s dilemma game that is characterized
by the temptation to defect T = b, reward for mutual cooper-
ation R = 1, and punishment P as well as the sucker’s payoff
S equalling 0, whereby 1 < b ≤ 2 ensures a proper pay-
off ranking [12]. The two main parameters to be considered
in the Results section are the probability to establish between-
group links p and the temptation to defect b. For further details
with regards to the studied evolutionary game and the set-up
we refer to the Methods section. Largely independent of the
topology of individual groups, we will show that intermediate
interdependence optimally facilitates the spreading of cooper-
ative behaviour between groups, and that between-group links
are in fact crucial for the more favourable outcome and thus
for the resolution of the prisoner’s dilemma.
Results
We begin by showing in Fig. 2(a) the fraction of cooper-
ators fC within both groups in dependence on the probabil-
ity to form between-group links p for different topologies of
group A. Without loss of generality, the topology of group
B is initially (before between-group links are formed) always
regular. It can be observed that, regardless of the topology of
FIG. 3: Cooperators are distributed unevenly between the two in-
terdependent groups, depending on the topologies that govern the in-
teractions in each individual group. Panels (a), (b) and (c) depict the
fraction of cooperators in groups A and B separately (see legend), as
obtained when group A has regular, random and scale-free topology,
respectively. If group B is a regular graph, the dilution of links there
has a more potent positive impact on cooperation (see [68, 69] for re-
lated work) than the additional links introduced to group A. Players
in group B in general always benefit from an optimal dilution, while
players in group A benefit most from the additional links if initially
they form a regular graph. If the topology of group A is random [as
in panel (b)] or scale-free [as in panel (c)], the new between-group
links stemming from players in group B have at most a marginal
impact. As in Fig. 2, results were obtained using the temptation to
defect b = 1.18.
group A, there exists an intermediate value of p at which fC
is maximal. The biggest rise compared to the base value ob-
tained for independent groups (p = 0) is obtained when the
topology of group A is regular, followed by the random and
scale-free topology. Especially for the late case the marginal
improvement is expected, given that scale-free networks alone
provide a very favourable environment for the evolution of co-
operation [22, 23]. Panels (b), (c) and (d) of Fig. 2 depict the
fraction of cooperators separately for players with and without
between-group links when group A has regular, random and
scale-free topology, respectively (see figure legend). As for
the overall fraction of cooperators, looking at fC separately
for players with and without between-group links preserves
the existence of an optimal values of p. In fact, fC peaks
at roughly the same value of p for players with and without
between-group links, only that for the former the base-line
value of fC is higher. It can thus be concluded that players
with between-group links are more likely to cooperate than
players without between-group links.
Further supporting these observations are results presented
in Fig. 3, which show the fraction of cooperators fC in de-
pendence on p separately for groups A and B (see figure leg-
end). As in Fig. 2, we consider group A with regular, random
and scale-free topology in panels (a), (b) and (c), respectively,
while the topology of group B is always regular. It can be ob-
served that the bell-like shape of the fC versus p dependence
stems mainly from the group B, i.e., the group where players
severe their in-group links to use them for forming between-
group links. In group A, on the other hand, fC simply in-
creases with increasing p for the regular [panel (a)] and ran-
dom [panel (b)] topology, or remains practically unchanged
for the scale-free [panel (c)] topology. Since between-group
links are added to the existing in-group links forming group A,
the increase in fC can be understood as a consequence of the
increase of heterogeneity of the interaction network of group
3FIG. 4: Players that share a between-group link are more likely
to both cooperate than players that are connected by means of in-
group links. Panels (a) and (b) explain and schematically depict the
determination of V , which quantifies the cooperativity of each indi-
vidual link. If a link connects two cooperators (defectors) V = 1
(V = 0), while cooperator-defector links yield V = 0.5. The exam-
ple in panel (b) thus yields Vavg = 5.5/12.0 ≈ 0.46 for in-group
links, and Vavg = 1.5/3.0 = 0.5 for between-group links. Aver-
aging V separately over all in-group and between-group links under
actual conditions yields results presented in panel (c), from where
it follows that between-group links are more likely to connect two
cooperators than in-group links, especially for low and intermedi-
ate values of p. This conclusion is further corroborated by results
presented in panel (d), where we show the probability of a player to
cooperate in the next round in dependence on the number of its coop-
erative neighbours. It can be observed that the probability is higher
for players that have between-group links than for players without
between-group links, especially if the player has only one, two, three
of four cooperative neighbours. Results presented in panels (c) and
(d) were obtained using random topology for group A and the temp-
tation to defect b = 1.18. For panel (d) we have used p = 0.15.
A. Indeed, the positive role of heterogeneity (diversity) for the
evolution of cooperation is firmly established, both for games
governed by pairwise interactions [66] as well as for games
governed by group interactions [67]. In case group A is char-
acterized by the scale-free topology, however, the addition of
between-group links can hardly elevate the heterogeneity, and
thus there fC remains practically constant regardless of the
value of p [see Fig. 3(c)]. The situation in group B is dif-
ferent, as there the existing in-group links are removed to be
substituted by between-group links. Effectively the regular
topology of group B becomes more and more diluted as p in-
creases, and indeed this may give rise to a bell-shaped outlay
of fC versus p. The role of dilution, albeit by removing play-
ers rather than links, has recently been studied in [68, 69],
and it was reported that such bell-shaped dependencies are in-
deed very much characteristic on diluted lattices. Notably, in
Fig. 3 the bells for group B differ since the links are not sim-
ply removed, but rather rewired to players that form group A.
From there the support for cooperation differs depending on
the topology of group A, which of course influences the out-
come of the evolutionary process also in group B.
From results presented in Figs. 2 and 3 it follows that
links, especially between-group links, play a crucial role by
the spreading of cooperative behaviour across interdependent
groups. Intuitively, it can be argued that in-group links are
responsible for the transmission of cooperation within each
group, while between-group links help to spread cooperation
also past the boundaries of individual groups. But which links
are more important, and which are more likely to contribute
to an efficient spread of cooperative behaviour? To determine
the role of the two types of links more accurately, we intro-
duce V as depicted schematically in Fig. 4(a). If a links con-
nects two cooperators V = 1. If a link connects two defec-
tors V = 0. And finally, if a link connects a cooperator and
a defector V = 0.5. In this way we obtain a proxy for the
role links play, and by averaging the value of V over all the
in-group and between-group links in the system, as schemat-
ically depicted in Fig. 4(b), we obtain a better understanding
of their relevance. Results presented in Fig. 4(c) show how
Vavg varies in dependence on p, separately for between-group
and in-group links (see figure legend). Expectedly, given the
definition of V , the dependence is bell-shaped with the max-
imum occurring at the same value of p as the maximum of
fC in Fig. 3(b) [where group A has random topology as used
also in Fig. 4(c)]. More importantly, it can be observed that
between-group links are more likely to connect cooperative
pairs than in-group links. Thus, between-group links appear
to be crucial for the spreading of cooperative behaviour across
interdependent groups. Further adding weight to this state-
ment are results presented in Fig. 4(d), where the probabil-
ity to cooperate in the next round is depicted in dependence
on the number of cooperative neighbours, separately for play-
ers with and without between-group links (see figure legend).
It can be observed that the probability to cooperate is higher
for players that have between-group links than it is for play-
ers without between-group links, especially if the player has
only one, two, three of four cooperative neighbours. We thus
conclude that between-group links are indeed more likely to
link two cooperators than in-group links, and that they are in
fact more crucial for the spreading of cooperative behaviour.
These findings are in agreement with the recent empirical ob-
servations in the Hadza camps [1], where it was observed that
there is high between-group and low within-group variation
in public goods game donations, and that the links between
camps are more likely between people who do cooperate than
between those who do not. The fact that players with more co-
operative neighbours are in general more likely to cooperate
in the next round, as can be observed in Fig. 4(d), also agrees
with the observations of Traulsen et al. [70], who reported
the same behaviour in the realm of human strategy updating
in evolutionary games. What is remarkable in our case is that
this probability is higher for players with between-group links
than it is for players without between-group links.
Lastly, we present in Fig. 5 colour maps encoding the over-
all fraction of cooperators in both groups in dependence on
p and b, thus obtaining a more comprehensive insight as to
the relevance of between-group links under differently severe
social dilemma conditions. The outcome depends quite sig-
nificantly on the topology of group A. If the topology is reg-
4FIG. 5: Optimal interdependence between two groups depends on
the temptation to defect. Panels (a), (b) and (c) present the colour-
encoded fraction of cooperators in both groups in dependence on the
probability to establish between-group links p and the temptation to
defect b when the topology of group A is regular, random and scale-
free, respectively. If the topology of group A is regular, panel (a)
reveals that there exists an optimal value of p only for sufficiently
large b ≥ 1.15. If the topology of group A is random, there exists an
optimal p almost independently of b, although the optimal value of p
shifts towards lower values as b increases. If group A has scale-free
topology, however, the impact of p is most illusive, since the scale-
free topology alone strongly promotes the evolution of cooperation
(see [22, 23]).
ular, as is the case in panel (a), there exists an optimal value
of p only for b > 1.15, while for b < 1.15 the impact of
between-group links is predominantly negative. If the topol-
ogy of group A is random, on the other hand, there exists an
optimal p irrespective of b, i.e., even if the conditions for co-
operation are relatively favourable, although the optimal value
of p shifts towards lower values as b increases. For group A
having scale-free topology the impact is rather negligible re-
gardless of b, as discussed already above when presenting re-
sults in Figs. 2 and 3. In conclusion, these results show that
significant advantages of group interdependence are to be ex-
pected only when the conditions for the evolution of coopera-
tion are harsh, and when isolated groups alone are hardly able
to keep defectors at bay. It is then that between-group links
can do wonders in channelling cooperative behaviour from
one group to another, and in doing so strengthening cooper-
ative behaviour in each of them beyond the limits imposed by
isolation.
Discussion
Summarizing, we have studied the evolution of cooperation
in the prisoner’s dilemma game on interdependent groups hav-
ing different interaction topology. We have shown that there
exists an optimal probability for a player in one group to se-
vere an in-group link and use this to establish a between-group
link with one randomly selected player from another group.
This conclusion is largely independent of the topology of the
two groups, although it can be observed best if groups initially
have either regular or random topology. If the initial topology
is scale-free, the positive impact of the scale-free topology
alone [22, 23] precludes significant improvements in the level
of cooperation that would be due to group interdependence.
If the initial topology is regular or random, however, notable
positive effects stem from the dilution of links in one group
and the addition of new links to the other group, although
the former effect in general proves to be stronger (for related
work see [68, 69]). We have also shown that players who have
between-group links are more likely to cooperate than players
without between-group links, and that between-group links
are indeed more likely to link two cooperators than in-group
links. These findings resonate with recent empirical observa-
tions in the Hadza camps [1], where it was observed that these
camps exhibit high between-group and low within-group vari-
ation in public goods game donations, and that the links be-
tween camps are more likely between people who do cooper-
ate than between those who do not. Our findings also agree
with previous theoretical research focusing on the evolution
of cooperation on interdependent networks, where it has been
shown, for example, that the coupling of the evolutionary dy-
namics in each of the two networks enhances the resilience of
cooperation, and that this is intrinsically related to the non-
trivial organization of cooperators across the interdependent
layers [8]. It was also reported that biased utility functions
suppress the feedback of individual success, which leads to
a spontaneous separation of characteristic time scales on the
two interdependent networks [6]. Consequently, cooperation
is promoted because the aggressive invasion of defectors is
more sensitive to the deceleration. Even if the utilities are
not biased, cooperation can still be promoted by means of in-
terdependent network reciprocity [7], which however requires
simultaneous formation of correlated cooperative clusters on
both networks. Altogether, these results point to the fact that
interdependence, be it between groups or other organizational
entities, can be exploited effectively to resolve social dilem-
mas. Yet too much interdependence is not good either – there
must also be sufficient independence for the individual net-
works to remain functional if the evolution of cooperation in
the other network goes wrong.
Methods
Groups are initially constructed either with a regular topol-
ogy where each player is connected to its k nearest neigh-
bours, or with a random topology where each player is also
connected to k other players, yet the latter are selected ran-
domly from within each group, or with a scale-free topology
according to the algorithm proposed by Baraba´si and Albert
[71]. We adopt a systematic approach, going from simple to
complex interaction topologies, in order to be able to under-
stand and interpret the results at various levels of interdepen-
dence.
For convenience, we denote the two groups as group A
and B, and we introduce a probability p according to which
each player in group B is allowed to sever one of its in-group
links to form a between-group link with one randomly cho-
sen player from group A. The constrain is, however, that no
player is allowed to have more than one between-group link.
When all players from group B have had the chance to form
between-group links, we arrive at the final interaction network
consisting of two interdependent groups, whereby the level of
interdependence in determined by p. The whole procedure is
depicted schematically in Fig. 1. Note that for p = 0 the two
5groups are independent, while for p = 1 they effectively act
as one as all the players from group B will be linked with all
the players from group A.
After constructing the interdependent groups, we start
Monte Carlo simulations of the evolutionary dynamics with
uniformly distributed cooperators and defectors, each thus oc-
cupying 1/2 of both groups. The accumulation of payoffs pix
follows a standard procedure. As noted in the introduction,
the prisoner’s dilemma game is characterized by the tempta-
tion to defect T = b, reward for mutual cooperation R = 1,
and punishmentP as well as the sucker’s payoff S equalling 0.
Two cooperators facing one another acquire R, two defectors
get P , whereas a cooperator receives S if facing a defector
who then gains T . The elementary games steps are as fol-
lows. First, a player x is randomly selected from either group,
and it acquires its payoff pix by playing the game with all its
neighbours, including those connected via in-group as well
as those connected via between-group links. Next, one ran-
domly chosen neighbour of x within either of the two groups
(thus could be connected via an in-group or a between-group
link), denoted by y, also acquires its payoff piy in the same
way. Lastly, if piy > pix player x attempts to adopt the strategy
sy from player y with a probability q = (piy − pix)/(kmaxb),
where kmax is the larger of the two degrees of players x and y.
This rule is applied instead of the more commonly used Fermi
rule [15] to avoid an unequal intensity of selection for players
with different degrees.
Presented results were obtained by using a regular topol-
ogy with k = 6 for group B, and either a regular, random
or scale-free topology with k = 4 (average degree in latter
case) for group A. Players in group B were then allowed to se-
vere one of their in-group links and form a between-group link
with probability p. The size of individual groups varied from
N = 100 to 10000, and we confirm the reported results being
robust within this interval. For smaller group sizes, however,
averages over more independent realizations are needed to ob-
tain statistically consistent simulation results. We have made
up to 1000 independent simulation runs lasting up to 105 full
Monte Carlo steps, during each of which all players received
the chance once on average to adopt the strategy of one of
their neighbours. It is also worth mentioning that exchang-
ing the topologies of groups A and B or varying the degree
k does not qualitatively change the presented results and the
main conclusions.
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